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THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF
LICENSED OCCUPATIONS
CHOOSING THEIR OwN EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION
JAROD M. BONA1
Academic journals, legal briefs, judicial opinion, and expert reports
scrutinize the pro-competitive benefits and anticompetitive harm of nearly
every private restraint imaginable.2 The resources-both financial and
brain-power-that pour over every angle of these restraints are staggering,
but not surprising. The Supreme Court has remarked that "[t]he heart of our
national economy has long been faith in the value of competition."3 The
decision whether to permit a particular restraint or action may affect
substantial commerce, so antitrust players tirelessly debate the optimal
policy.
With a few exceptions,4 there are certain obvious and significant
anticompetitive activities receive little to no attention-state and local
government restraints.5 Antitrust regulation of these restraints is limited by
1. Jarod M. Bona is an antitrust attorney in DLA Piper's Minneapolis and San Diego
offices. He received his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2001. The views expressed in this
article are solely his own and do not necessarily represent the views of his firm or their clients.
2. Jarod M. Bona, Loyalty Discounts And The FTC's Lawsuit Against Intel, 19
COMPETITION: THE J. OF THE ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW SECTION OF THE
STATE BAR OF CAL. 6, 8 (Spring 2010) ("[L]awyers and economists fill lots of space in both
economic and law journals debating the precompetitive and anticompetitive effects of various
agreements and actions.").
3. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
4. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has played a very active role in trying to
regulate and eliminate these public restraints.
5. Timothy J. Muris, State Intervention/State Action-A U.S. Perspective (Fordham Annual
Conference on International Law & Policy), 1-2, (October 24, 2003),
http://ssm.com/abstract-id=545163 ("Although private restraints have received the most attention
in antitrust, focusing exclusively on these restraints leaves a gaping hole in the antitrust
enforcement net."). (The former Federal Trade Commission Chairman explained that
"[a]ttempting to protect competition by focusing solely on private restraints is like trying to stop
the flow of water at a fork in a stream by blocking only of the channels. Unless you block both
channels, you are not likely to even slow, much less stop, the flow. Eventually, all the water will
flow toward the unblocked channel.") Id. at 2.
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the "state action immunity" doctrine,6 which struggles to accommodate both
federal competition policy and the state's sovereign status within our
federal system.7 These public restraints take many forms, from limiting the
number of taxicab licenses in a city to professional advertising restrictions
to actual price or output restrictions. This article, however, focuses on state
and local licensing restrictions. In doing so, it examines two instances
where state boards that are predominantly made up of licensed occupations
enact policies that expand the sphere of commerce that is reserved by law to
these occupations.' These examples present compelling circumstances for
antitrust regulation because the deciding board is dominated by members
with private incentives to expand the scope of the occupation to the
detriment of consumers and competitors from other occupations.
Part I of this article examines licensing and its impact on competition.
Licensing, and activities by licensing boards, have both stated benefits and
anticompetitive harms. Part II analyzes the antitrust regulation of licensing
boards, including whether their actions violate the antitrust laws, and more
interestingly, whether the antitrust laws even apply to licensing boards. To
answer this question, this article provides a detailed discussion of the state
action immunity doctrine, and how it applies to various entities. Part III
argues that state licensing boards that take actions expanding their own
jurisdiction should face antitrust scrutiny. The argument is that the state
action immunity doctrine should not apply in these instances, unless the
state board can satisfy a heightened test. To demonstrate that this is not
merely a hypothetical problem, but a recurrent one, Part III discusses two
specific and recent situations where a state licensing board enacted an
anticompetitive policy to protect its members from competition.
I. LICENSING AND ITS IMPACT ON COMPETITION
Governments have restricted entry to many occupations by requiring
individuals who want to practice in that area to fulfill certain
requirements-including an initial and yearly fee-to obtain a license.9
While the stated rationale for such a restraint typically focuses on the health
and safety of citizens, or assuring quality, the capture theory recognizes the
6. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
7. F.T.C. Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force, p. 5 (2003); Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992) (concluding that the Parker v.
Brown decision "was grounded in principles of federalism"). But see Einer Richard Elhauge, The
Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REv. 667, 669 (1991) (arguing that these interests
cannot be accommodated because they are truly conflicting interests).
8. See generally Op. of the Comm'n, NC. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343
(Feb. 9, 2011); Mitz v. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam'rs, 278 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App.
2008).
9. See generally MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? (2006).
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financial benefits of the restraint to individuals already within the licensed
occupation."0 Indeed, Milton Friedman argued in Capitalism & Freedom
that "[t]he pressure [for the imposition of occupational licensing standards]
invariably comes from members of the occupation itself," rather than an
aggrieved public." Ultimately, however, licensing regimes incorporate a
combination of both benefits and anticompetitive harm. 2
A. The Basics ofLicensing
Licensing occupations is not a new idea. Scholars, for example, cite the
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, back in 1780 BCE, and the medieval
guilds of Europe as illustrations of early rules governing occupations. 3 The
Hammurabi Code regulated both medical fees and practitioner punishment
for negligent treatment, while the medieval guilds maintained tough
restrictions for those entering a craft or occupation. 4 Adam Smith himself,
in The Wealth of Nations, recognized the economic impact of licensing
when he discussed how crafts increased their earnings by lengthening
apprenticeship programs and limiting the number of apprentices per
master. 5 He explained that the purpose of these policies is to "restrain the
competition to a much smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to
enter the trade."' 6 More specifically, the "limitation of the number of
apprentices restrains it directly," while the "long term of apprenticeship
restrains it more indirectly, but as effectually, by increasing the expense of
education."'
17
Systematic licensing developed in the United States at the state level in
the late nineteenth century following the regulation of professions such as
10. KLEINER, supra note 9, at 34-35; Carolyn Cox & Susan Foster, Federal Trade
Commission Bureau of Economics, Economic Issues: The Costs and Benefits of Occupational
Regulation 18-19 (October 1990) (explaining that the "capture theory of occupational regulation
argues that regulation is a response to professionals who seek to protect themselves from
competition and thereby increase their incomes"); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the
Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 23 (1983) ("Although state and local legislatures
may say that their schemes are better than the markets they replace, many scholars believe, and
the evidence shows, that regulatory laws owe more to interest group politics than to legislators'
concern for the welfare of society at large."). Cox & Foster note that "[r]egulation designed to
limit entry will decrease supply and increase prices." Supra note 10, at 19.
11. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 140 (1962) quoted in John T. Delacourt &
Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on the Property Role of Government,
72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1080 (2005).
12. See generally, Cox & Foster, supra note 10; KLEINER (2006), supra note 9.
13. KLEINER (2006), supra note 9, at xiii & 19; Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 2.
14. KLEINER (2006), supra note 9, at xiii & 19. The merchant guilds from the Middle Ages
and "Enlightenment" served as models for the professional associations that exist today. Id. at 19.
15. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book I, Chapter 10, Part 11 (1776) cited in
KLEINER, supra note 9, at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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doctors and lawyers.'" But it is in the last 50 years, as jobs have become
more complex, that licensing has really taken off "as one of the fastest-
growing labor market institutions in the United States and other
industrialized nations."' 9 Licensing is now pervasive, as about 50
occupations are licensed in all states and over 800 of them are licensed in at
least one state. 0
Under a licensing regime, it is illegal for a person to practice the
licensed occupation without meeting the regime's promulgated standards. 21
A typical licensing regime is governed by a state-sanctioned board that is
predominately controlled by members of the regulated profession.22 These
boards set entry requirements, enact conduct rules, and even discipline
individuals that violate the board rules.23 Although the entry requirements
vary from state-to-state and occupation-to-occupation, they typically
include some combination of the following: (1) specific formal education;
(2) experience or apprenticeship; (3) an examination; (4) good moral
character; and (5) citizenship or residency of a particular state.24 Not
surprisingly, there is great variation in the extent to which the licensing
regime increases barriers to entry. For example, medical school and law
schools (and the accompanying examinations to practice) create higher
barriers to entry than an occupation that may, for example, only require
attendance in short courses with an exam that covers the relevant material.
Licensure, which governs the right to practice, is the most common
regulatory framework for occupations, but less competitively-harmful
alternatives exist.25 For example, certification differs from licensure in that
any person may perform the relevant tasks, but a government or non-profit
18. AMY HUMPHRIES, MORRIS M. KLEINER & MARIA KOUMENTA, How Does Government
Regulate Occupations in the UK and US? Issues and Policy Implications, LABOUR MARKET
POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7.1 (David Marsden ed.), Oxford University Press (forthcoming
2011); KLEINER , supra note 9, at xiii & 20. In 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court established in Dent
v. West Virginia that states could grant licenses under their police power. 129 U.S. 114, 128
(1889).
19. KLEINER, supra note 9, at xiii.
20. Id. at 5; Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 3. And this number could increase, as a February
2011 Wall Street Journal article about the proliferation of licensing explains that cat groomers
have formed a professional organization that hopes to one day convince Ohio and other states to
license cat groomers. Stephanie Simon, A License to Shampoo: Jobs Needing State Approval Rise,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 7,2011.
21. KLEIN ER (2006), supra note 9, at 18.
22. Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 3; Clark C. Havighurst, Contesting Anticompetitive
Actions Taken in the Name of the State: State Action Immunity and Health Care Markets, 31 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 587, 596 (June 2006) ("Although practices vary, many states appoint
the members of such boards from lists of nominees provided by the professional or occupational
group being regulated. A public member or two is usually appointed as well, but such boards are
rarely less than friendly to and supportive of the licensed group.").
23. Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 3.
24. Id. at 3-4.
25. KLEINER , supra note 9, at 18; Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 3.
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entity anoints those who have passed the level of skill and knowledge
required-typically through an examination-as "certified. '26 Travel agents
and car mechanics, for example, are typically certified, but not licensed.
27
By attaching a badge of skill and knowledge to certain individuals,
certification can provide many of the informational benefits of licensing,
but without the barriers to entry.2s The least onerous form of regulation is
registration, which merely requires individuals that want to practice an
occupation to file their name, addresses, and perhaps other qualifications
with a government agency.29 While registration may not signal quality to
consumers like licensure and certification, state officials may use the threat
of registration revocation to incent individuals to provide high-quality
service.3"
B. The Benefits of Licensing
When establishing a licensing regime-regardless of the actual
motives-the government entity and the sponsoring occupation will
describe several benefits to the regulation. Most prominently, regulators
point out that licensing is necessary to protect the health and safety of
citizens by assuring higher quality services.3' The mandatory entry
requirements are supposed to increase the quality of the occupations'
services by controlling the quality of inputs (education, experience, etc.)
into the production of these services.32 Licensing can, for example, screen
out individuals whose skill or character is likely to undermine quality.33
26. HUMPHRIS, KLEINER & KOUMENTA, supra note 18, at 7.2; Cox & Foster, supra note 10,
at 43-46.
27. HUMPHRIS, KLEINER & KOUMENTA, supra note 18, at 7.2.
28. See Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 44 (explaining that certification allows "consumers
greater freedom of choice" because an "individual could choose either a lower priced, noncertified
professional or a higher priced, certified one"). Cox & Foster also explain that "one potential
source of market failure in professional markets is asymmetric information on quality." Id at 5;
see also HUMPHRIES, KLEINER & KOUMENTA, supra note 18, at 7.7 ("[Llicensing signals to
consumers that the service they are receiving meets certain standards and therefore consumer
uncertainty is minimized and demand for the service increases.").
29. KLEINER (2006), supra note 9, at 18; Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 49; Humphries,
Kleiner & Koumenta, supra note 18, at 7.1.
30. Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 49-50.
3 1. Morris M. Kleiner & Charles Wheelen, Occupational Licensing Matters: Wages, Quality
and Social Costs, CESIFO DICE REPORT 4 (March 2010); Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 21
("Regardless of whether consumers or professionals demand regulation, the rationale for
occupational regulation has typically been to protect the public's health and safety by
guaranteeing a mandatory quality standard.").
32. Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 2 1. There is some doubt, however, whether these input
restrictions actually increase the quality of the output. Id at 22; see also Kleiner & Wheelen,
supra note 31, at 4 ("Licensure can potentially improve the quality of service in cases where
consumers are unable to make an informed decision and society has some stake in their
wellbeing.").
33. HUMPHRIES, KLEINER & KOUMENTA, supra note 18, at 7.6.
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Moreover, licensing boards can monitor performance standards and punish
those that deviate from them.34  Some regulators and professional
associations may also argue their business-practice regulations will increase
the quality of the services.35 These types of regulations might include, for
example, restrictions on advertising, branch offices, and trade names.36
A full evaluation of these proposed benefits is beyond the scope of this
article, but economic studies have been mixed at best, putting many of these
benefits into doubt.37 Morris M. Kleiner, in his 2006 book, Licensing
Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?, analyzed
major academic studies on the quality and demand effects of licensing in
the United States.38 He concluded that "few of these studies of demand and
quality show significant benefits of occupational regulation."3 9 According
to Kleiner, the results show only modest effects on the demand for and
quality of services, as a result of licensing.n Moreover, a 1990 report by the
Bureau of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) explained
that the theoretical literature indicates that entry restrictions from licensing
will not necessarily increase quality because many factors that are not
controlled by licensing also affect quality.4 ' The professional is free to
adjust downward the level of inputs not controlled by licensing, and may do
so to compensate for the mandates from licensing.42 For example,
individuals that must pass a written contractor's test to receive their license
may spend extra time preparing for the exam and less time with actual
hands-on training.43
C. The Anticompetitive Effects of Licensing
While the benefits of licensing schemes are questionable,44 the
anticompetitive effects are more apparent.4 5 Indeed, anticompetitive effects
34. Id.
35. Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 25. Cox & Foster explain, however, that while a few
studies indicate that such licensing restrictions may increase quality, the majority of work (as of
1990) finds quality to be unaffected by these business practice restrictions. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., KLEINER, supra note 9, at 43-64.
38. Id. at 52-56.
39. Id. at 56.
40. Id. In contrast, most studies show that licensing increases the prices of the services. Id. at
59.
41. Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 22.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 22-23.
44. Some evidence suggests that licensing may initially have positive effects through the
standardization of the quality of service that is expected, but that these benefits diminish with time
and the occupation eventually focuses on restriction of supply. KLEINER, supra note 9, at 39-40.
45. According to Morris M. Kleiner, "[e]conomists generally accept that licensing is a way of
limiting competition since they argue that licenses limit labor supply, often quite explicitly
through varying the pass rates and statutory regulations on residency requirements." KLEINER
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may arise not only out of the licensing scheme itself, but from the
subsequent actions of boards that govern the licensed occupations.4 6 One
theory even suggests that occupations lobby to become regulated through
licensure so their members can receive the rents that accompany
anticompetitive conduct.47
The most obvious anticompetitive effect of licensing is restricted entry.
By mandating certain educational requirements, exams, or experiences,
licensing schemes increase the barriers to entry for a particular occupation,
and thereby reduce the number of individuals that enter that occupation. 48
Other restrictions could include limited interstate mobility by lack of
reciprocity for licenses from state-to-state, or straight restrictions on
advertising and other commercial practices. 49 An FTC study concluded, for
example, that fees for certain routine legal services were higher in cities that
had time, place, and manner restrictions on advertising.5"
As he did for claims about quality,5 Kleiner in 2006 analyzed the major
academic studies on the price impact of licensing policies and concluded
that they increased prices between 4 and 35 percent, depending upon the
type of commercial practice and location. 2 While these price increases
could be the result of rent-capture by occupations that limit entry or restrict
price information, there are less pernicious alternative explanations that
focus on reduced uncertainty in the service, higher quality, a higher
perception of quality, or greater complexity in licensed fields that require
more education or training. 3 A more recent paper by Kleiner and Charles
Wheelan concluded that estimates show that occupational licensing raises
the wages of licensed practitioners in the United States by about 15
percent.54
(2006), supra note 9, at 11 -12.
46. HUMPHRIES, KLEINER & KOUMENTA, supra note 18, at 7.8 ("[O]nce an occupation
becomes licensed, the corresponding occupational association has the power further to limit
supply through various ways. For example, it can upgrade the educational and general
requirements for entry, control examination pass rates and residency requirements before one can
apply for a license.").
47. KLEINER, supra note 9, at 45 ("The capture theory of occupational regulation argues that
licensing is a response by professionals who seek to protect themselves from competition.").
48. See Havighurst, supra note 22, at 596 ("True to their origins and cartel-like character,
licensing boards constituted principally by representatives of the regulated group not only adopt
licensing standards that raise entry costs and limit the number of competitors in the field but also
frequently adopt regulations that directly restrain trade."); see also HUMPHRIES, KLEINER &
KOUMENTA, supra note 18, at 7.8 (explaining that there is indeed evidence that the supply of
practitioners in regulated occupations is indeed restricted by licensing).
49. KLEINER, supra note 9, at 59; see also Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 29-36.
50. Staff Report by the F.T.C.'s Bureau of Economics and Cleveland Regional Office,
Improving Consumer Access to Legal Services (1984) cited in Cox & Foster, supra note 1 0, at 33.
51. KLEINER, supra note 9, at 52-56.
52. Id. at 59.
53. Id. at 59-62.
54. Kleiner & Wheelan, supra note 3 1, at 3 1.
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While many anticompetitive harms involve entry or regulation of the
licensed occupation itself, a board made up of a particular occupation 5 has
incentives to expand its own territory at the expense of other occupations,
and of consumers 6.5  Thus, it is the edges between professions or
occupations that may provide the most systematically-concerning
anticompetitive conduct. For instance, a board of dentists may decree that
only licensed dentists within a state may provide teeth-whitening services."
Or a board of veterinarians may decide that only licensed veterinarians
within a state may practice horse teeth floating, which is the practice of
filing down the outer contours of an animal's teeth.58 Both of these are real-
world examples of licensing board actions that seek to eliminate
competition for their respective professions. One of these actions was
challenged by the FTC for its anticompetitive effects,59 while the other was
challenged on other grounds, but could also likely form the basis of a
private or governmental antitrust action.6" These examples of
anticompetitive board actions and their relationship to the antitrust laws are
examined in-depth in Part III.
A state board or occupation may be able to defend its decision on some
basis to impose or expand licensing restrictions or create business practice
restrictions. But these restrictions-even if implemented for benevolent
reasons-may still result in anticompetitive effects on a particular market
and harm consumers through higher prices or reduced output.
II. THE ANTITRUST REGULATION OF LICENSING BOARDS
It is only natural to ask whether state or local licensing boards that take
actions resulting in anticompetitive harm are violating the antitrust laws.
After all, the antitrust laws exist to protect competition and, as described
above, licensing and actions by licensing boards may, in many instances,
harm competition.
55. Moreover, the anticompetitive harm of licensing itself may increase when the regulatory
board is controlled by the profession, as professionals have an incentive to limit entry by setting
entry requirements that are too high. Cox & Foster, supra note 10, at 37.
56. KLEINER, supra note 9, at 25 ("Recent issues involve the attempts by the professions to
capture work from other occupations or to restrict the ability of licensed or unlicensed
occupations, such as alternative health care providers, to do work within the occupations' 'span of
control."'); see also Havighurst, supra note 22, at 596 ("State boards also tend to be protective of
the domains of the professionals they regulate, fighting incursions by unauthorized practitioners
and assisting their licensees in dividing markets with other occupations.").
57. See Complaint, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 (June 17,2000).
58. See Mitz, 278 S.W.3d at 20.
59. See Complaint, NC Bd. of Dental Exam "rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 (June 17, 2000).
60. See Mitz, 278 S.W.3d at 20.
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A. Does the Action Violate the Antitrust Laws?
Not all actions that result in some anticompetitive harm are violations
of the antitrust laws. Depending upon the type of restraint at issue, a court
will apply a per se rule,6 the rule of reason, 62 or something in between like
the quick-look review.63 Unless the restraint is a per se violation of the
antitrust laws, a reviewing court will also examine the pro-competitive
benefits or business justifications for the challenged activity. Per se
violations include specific types of agreements that "would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output."' These
include, for example, price fixing, market allocation, bid rigging, limited
types of tying, and certain horizontal group boycotts-typically
anticompetitive agreements among horizontal competitors. Other
potentially anticompetitive conduct requires courts to compare the benefits
or justifications for the activity with the anticompetitive harm. Conduct
involving licensing boards that are made up of members of the relevant
occupation could fall into the per se category because it involves
agreements among horizontal competitors to restrain trade in some manner.
But each situation must be analyzed separately.
B. Is the Licensing Board's Action Excluded From Antitrust Review Under
the State Action Immunity Doctrine?
The U.S. Supreme Court established in its Parker v. Brown decision in
1943 that the federal antitrust laws do not apply to certain state conduct.65
The Court emphasized federalism and state sovereignty when it interpreted
the Sherman Act to not apply to the activities of a state.66 This decision
spawned what is now called the "state immunity" doctrine. 67 Eventually,
61. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) ("The
per se rule, treating categories of restraints as necessarily illegal, eliminates the need to study the
reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work."); UnitedStates
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
62. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885 ("The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether
a practice restrains trade in violation of § I .").
63. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (explaining that
under the quick-look analysis, "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets").
64. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).
65. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
66. Id. "The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was
intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." Id. Heather K. Gerken, in
her 2010 forward to the Harvard Law Review, explained that with regard to federalism, "while the
Court continues to make much of sovereignty, most of the field has rejected a notion that it
determines federalism's metes and bounds." 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (2010).
67. Note, however, that despite its name, this doctrine did not really create an "immunity,"
but is instead recognizes that the Sherman Act does not cover conduct by certain actors. See S.C.
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however, the doctrine evolved in such a way that the federalism and state
sovereignty rationales have displaced the statutory interpretation of the
Sherman Act as the driving force behind what is excluded from antitrust
scrutiny.68 For example, the Supreme Court affirmatively stated about
Parker in Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Company
that "[o]ur decision was grounded in principles of federalism. '69 The Court
elaborated that the "principle of freedom of action for the States, adopted to
foster and preserve the federal system, explains the later evolution and
application of the Parker doctrine in our [subsequent decisions]."7 ° These
federalism principles, however, do not always lead to an easy answer to the
question of whether particular conduct can legally evade antitrust review.
As explained in more detail below, this is particularly the case for state
regulatory bodies, like state licensing boards.
It is not accurate to conclude that the state action doctrine
accommodates principles of federalism and state sovereignty on the one
hand, and the federal policies embodied in the antitrust laws favoring
competitive markets on the other hand."' Instead, as presently constituted,
the doctrine simply chooses state sovereign interests over the federal
antitrust laws. 2 The real battle is to determine whether a particular
challenged action actually flows from the state acting as sovereign or from
some other basis.73 If the action is that of the "State acting as a sovereign,"
State Bd. of Dentistry v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 455 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2006) (rejecting state
board's argument that the doctrine creates immunity from suit such that it can immediately appeal
the F.T.C.'s determination that it is not entitled to protection under Parker).
68. See William J. Martin, State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally Supervised
Parties, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2005). Martin also notes that since the Parker decision,
scholars have argued that the Court's statutory interpretation based upon legislative history was
incorrect. Id. See, e.g., Paul E. Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing
Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 71, 83 (1974) ("In truth, a full reading of the legislative
history of the Sherman Act is not likely to help answer the Parker question one way or another.").
69. 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992).
70. Id.
71. See Elhauge, supra note 7, at 670 (explaining that there "is no principled way for courts
to reconcile [these] truly conflicting interests").
72. See id. ("Specifically, the Court treats 'state action' as immune from antitrust scrutiny,
and then endeavors to adjudicate cases based on some formal understanding of which actions can
and cannot be attributed to 'the state as sovereign."'). Elhauge, back in 1991, accurately stated that
the issue is whether a particular action can be attributed to the sovereign state. He also developed
the thesis that the dividing line between state and private action is functional, even if the Court
adjudicates the issues on formal grounds. Id. at 671. This position has developed support with the
F.T.C., in particular, which recently applied a functional approach to conclude that a state-
licensing board made up of members of the regulated profession is treated like a private entity
because its members are financially-interested in the challenged regulation. Op. of the Comm'n,
supra note 8.
73. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569 (1984) ("When the conduct is that of the
sovereign itself. .. the danger of an unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise."). The Supreme
Court has made it clear that a municipality is not considered a sovereign, and is therefore not ipso
facto exempt from application of the antitrust laws. City of Lafayette, La. v. La. Power & Light
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the antitrust restrictions, under current law, do not apply.74
But what is the state acting as a sovereign? Courts are still struggling to
answer that question, particularly for state regulatory boards. There is no
bright line test that applies to all circumstances. Instead, the nature of the
test depends upon the source of the alleged anticompetitive act. Courts
consider direct actions by the state legislature75 and state supreme court
(acting in a legislative manner)7 6 as the sovereign state itself, and therefore
free from federal antitrust scrutiny.77 For all other state-related actions,
courts will apply some form of the test that the U.S. Supreme Court
described in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.78 This Midcal test has two requirements for antitrust
immunity: First, the challenged restraint must be "one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy," and second, the policy must be
"actively supervised" by the State itself." Courts apply this Midcal test to
determine whether the challenged practice ultimately flows from the
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393 (1978); see also Delacourt & Zywicki, supra note 11, at 1082-83
("Breaking with the Parker opinion, the City of Lafayette opinion places a significantly stronger
emphasis on the federalism rationale for the decision. Rather than leaving the door open to a
broader exemption, available to 'public' and 'governmental' entities generally, the Court makes it
clear that a federal system recognizes only two sovereigns-federal and state.").
74. A major weakness of the state-sovereignty and federalism approach to antitrust
exclusions is that it does not account for state activity with interstate effects. That is, it ignores the
fact that, within federalism, state sovereignty itself is limited when it interferes with our national
economy or has effects beyond the state's borders. Indeed, aggrieved parties may challenge such
actions under our federal Constitution by bringing a dormant commerce clause challenge. See,
e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Whitman, 437 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting W.Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994)). ("The dormant Commerce Clause 'prohibits
the states from imposing restrictions that benefit in-state economic interests at out-of-state
interests' expense, thus reinforcing the principle of the unitary national market."'). Not allowing
antitrust challenges to sovereign state actions that have anticompetitive interstate effects credits
state sovereignty with greater power with regard to the antitrust laws than it has in our federal
system. In other words, the doctrine loses its federalism character in exchange for a state power
approach. The F.T.C., in its 2003 Report of the State Action Task Force, decried courts' lack of
attention to these interstate spillovers of anticompetitive state action. See F.T.C. Office of Policy
Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force, September 2003, pp. 40-44. The F.T.C.
expressed concern that "out-of-state citizens adversely affected by spillovers typically have no
participation rights and effectively are disenfranchised on the issue." Id. at 41-42; see also Frank
H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 39-40 (1983)
("Since Parker the Court has not even hinted that antitrust scrutiny of a state's program might
depend upon whether the effects of that program are broadcast outside the state's borders. It has
left all scrutiny of interstate effects to the jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause.").
75. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52; S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48, 63 (1985) (citing New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96
(1978)).
76. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 362-63 (1977).
77. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569 (explaining that where the challenged conduct is that of the state
legislature or supreme court, no further inquiry is necessary).
78. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
79. Id. (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
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sovereign state.8"
1. Private entities
Private-entity activities are subject to both prongs of the Midcal test.8"
In Midcal itself, the Court invalidated a California statute that forbade
wholesalers in the wine trade to sell below prices set by the wine
producer.8 2 The Court held that the California system for wine pricing
satisfied the first part of the test-the legislation was "forthrightly stated
and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance."83 But it failed
the second requirement for immunity-active state supervision-because
the "State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established
by private parties."84 The Court explained what the State did not do: "The
State neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price
schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any 'pointed
reexamination' of the program."" The Court, applying the test that would
eventually bear the name of its decision, concluded that the "national policy
in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of
state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing
arrangement.
8 6
In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, the
Supreme Court weakened the first prong of the Midcal test-clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy-by holding that it does
not require a state statute to explicitly authorize the specific restraint at
issue.87 Instead, it is enough that the "sovereign clearly intends to displace
competition in a particular field with a regulatory structure. '88 The Court
80. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568. The F.T.C. recently explained that "[b]ecause the balance
between competition policy and federalism embodied in the state action doctrine exempts only
sovereign policy choices from federal antitrust scrutiny, non-sovereign defendants invoking the
state action defense must clear additional hurdles to ensure that their challenged conduct truly
comports with a state decision to forego the benefits of competition to pursue alternative goals."
Op. of the Comm'r, supra note 8, at 1.
81. Ticor Title, 504 U.S. at 633; Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988); S. Motor
Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57.
82. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. When Midcal was decided, resale price maintenance practices
were per se illegal. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407
(1911). But in Leegin, the Supreme Court overruled Dr. Miles and held that these types of vertical
agreements would instead be analyzed under the rule of reason. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882.
83. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 105-06.
86. Id. at 106; see also Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (explaining that "a state does not give
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring
that their action is lawful").
87. 471 U.S. at 64.
88. S. Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
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explained that if "more detail than a clear intent to displace competition
were required of the legislature, States would find it difficult to implement
through regulatory agencies their anticompetitive policies."89 Southern
Motor Carriers involved a price-fixing challenge by the United States
Department of Justice to joint freight rates prepared for motor carriers by
private rate-setting bureaus that were set up by state law.90 As private
activity, both prongs of the Midcal test applied in Southern Motor
Carriers.9 But, as discussed below, by weakening the first part of the test,
Southern Motor Carriers raised the stakes for the question of whether an
entity is private or public because public entities need not fulfill the second
part of the Midcal test.92
The Supreme Court applied this second prong of the Midcal test-
active state supervision-in Patrick v. Burget to hold that activities of a
private hospital peer-review committee were subject to the antitrust laws.93
In contrast to the holding in Southern Motor Carriers that the first prong of
the Midcal test only requires that a state intend to generally displace
competition in a particular field through a regulatory structure,94 the active
state supervision prong requires that a state supervise the particular
anticompetitive conduct. 95 The Patrick court explained that the "active
supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that state officials have and
exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties
and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy." 96 This
requirement fulfills the state sovereign approach to state antitrust immunity
because "[a]bsent such a program of supervision, there is no realistic
assurance that a private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state
policy, rather than merely the party's individual interests." 97
In Ticor Title, the Supreme Court reiterated that the "active
supervision" requirement is not a rubber stamp when it held that a state's
"negative option" system of oversight is not sufficient supervision to avoid
antitrust review. 98 Under the "negative option" review, rates filed by private
89. Id. Delving into the principles of administrative law, the Court explained that "[a]gencies
are created because they are able to deal with problems unforeseeable to, or outside the
competence of, the legislature. Requiring express authorization for every action that an agency
might find necessary to effectuate state policy would diminish, if not destroy, its usefulness." Id.
90. Id. at 50.
91. Id. at 65-66. The government conceded active supervision in this case. Id. at 66.
92. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34,47 (1985).
93. 486 U.S. at 100.
94. S. Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
95. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01.
96. Id. at 101.
97. Id. at 100-01.
98. 504 U.S. at 638. Delacourt and Zywicki argue that this decision is further evidence that
the Court is moving further away from the public interest approach developed in Parker and
toward a public choice approach that is much more skeptical about state oversight. Delacourt &
Zywicki, supra note 11, at 1084-85 ("While the Parker Court seemed content to defer to most-
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parties become effective unless they are rejected by the state within a set
time.99 Reiterating the "active" part of the "active state supervision"
requirement, the Court held that the "mere potential for state supervision is
not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State."' 0
2. Municipalities
If the entity with the alleged anticompetitive activity is considered
"public," however, it need only satisfy the clear articulation part of the
Midcal test to avoid antitrust scrutiny.' O' In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, for example, the Court concluded that "the active state supervision
requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a
municipality."'0 2 The Court reasoned that "[w]here a private party is
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is
acting to further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of
the State."'0 3 In contrast, "[w]here the actor is a municipality, there is little
or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement."' 4
In addition to clarifying that municipalities do not have to prove active
state supervision to avoid antitrust liability, the Court added further content
to Midcal's "clear articulation" requirement by holding that an entity can
satisfy it by showing that their anticompetitive conduct is a "foreseeable"
result of state legislation." 5 The legislature does not need to explicitly state
indeed, almost all-state oversight efforts, the Ticor [Title] Court was substantially more
skeptical.").
99. Ticor Title, 504 U.S. at 638.
100. Id. The Court elaborated further on the policy behind the state immunity doctrine and the
second prong of the Midcal test: "[Tihe purpose of the active supervision inquiry is not to
determine whether the State has met some normative standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory
practices. Its purpose is to determine whether the State has exercised sufficient independent
judgment and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been established as a product of
deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement among private parties." Id. at 634-35.
101. See Report of the State Action Task Force, supra note 7, at 15. ("[T]he need for active
supervision turns on whether the relevant actor is public or private. It is well settled that purely
private actors claiming to act pursuant to state policy are subject to the active supervision test,
while municipalities are not subject to that requirement.").
102. 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985). In a footnote, the Court also stated that in "cases in which the
actor is a state agency, it is likely that active supervision would also not be required, although we
do not here decide that issue." Id. at 46 n.10. This, of course, is an open question right now that
depends, in part, upon the composition of the state agency. See, e.g., Op. of the Comm'n, supra
note 8, at 8-14.
103. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
104. Id. The Court also explained that municipal conduct is more likely to be exposed to
public scrutiny than private conduct. Id. at 45 n.9. For example, "[m]unicipalities in some States
are subject to 'sunshine' laws or other mandatory disclosure regulations, and municipal officers,
unlike corporate heads, are checked to some degree through the electoral process." Id.
105. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41-42; see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver.,
Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1991) ("It is enough, we have held, if suppression of competition is
the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes [citation omitted]. That condition is amply
met here.").
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that it expects the City to engage in anticompetitive activity; it is enough
that "it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result" from
broad authority to regulate in a particular area."0 6 Once again, by further
weakening the "clear articulation" requirement, the Court increased the
emphasis on the decision whether an entity is public or private because the
"clear articulation" requirement is the only part of the Midcal test that
applies to "public" entities.
3. State Agencies
It is still an open question whether certain state executive branch
agencies like licensing boards are subject to the "public" or "private"
Midcal test.0 7 Formally, state agencies are clearly "public," but there is
increasing support to apply both prongs of the Midcal test to state agencies
that have a public/private hybrid character. That support follows a move
away from the formal approach of determining whether an agency is public
to a more functional approach that looks at the incentives of the particular
individuals that are part of the agency.0 8
The Supreme Court has not officially addressed the issue of whether a
hybrid state agency should face the active supervision requirement to avoid
antitrust scrutiny. But, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar-a case preceding
Midcal-the court held that a bar association, which "is a state agency for
some limited purposes," is subject to the antitrust laws when it provides that
deviation from county bar minimum fees may lead to disciplinary action.0 9
Thus, the state bar association in Goldfarb is an example of a hybrid public-
private entity that was "a state agency by law."' " Even though it is a state
agency, it does not possess an "antitrust shield that allows it to foster
106. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42. In a earlier decision, however, the Court held in Cmty.
Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder that a broad state-constitutional home-rule provision for a
municipality is enough to clearly articulate the intent to displace competition. 455 U.S. 40, 56
(1982). Thus, for a municipality to take advantage of state action immunity, broad powers to
manage its own affairs are not enough to survive the Midcal test.
107. F.T.C. Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force, p. 37 (2003)
("[T]here is a gray area consisting of hybrid state or local entities with a combination of some
governmental characteristics and the active participation of private actors, such as regulatory
boards and special purpose authorities (e.g. hospital and airport authorities).").
108. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 7, at 671 (arguing that the state action immunity case law
"adjudicating the distinction between state and private action embodies the process view that
restraints on competition must be subject to antitrust review whenever the persons controlling the
terms of the restraints stand to profit financially from the restraints they impose"). In criticizing
the formal approach, the FTC explains that "[t]he government attributes of a hybrid entity-such
as its establishment to serve a governmental purpose, bond authority, power of eminent domain, or
tax status-are not necessarily probative of whether there is danger that private actors/members
will pursue their own economic interests rather than the state's policies." F.T.C. Office of Policy
Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force, p. 38 (September 2003).
109. 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
110. Id. at 789-90.
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anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.""' In analyzing
whether state action immunity should apply, the Court explained (in
different words) that the anticompetitive activity was neither clearly
articulated nor actively supervised by the state."2 Notably, Goldfarb is one
of several cases that the Court reviewed in Midcal before stating that
"[t]hese decisions" establish two standards for antitrust immunity under
Parker v. Brown."3
The Court in Town of Hallie stated in dicta that in "cases in which the
actor is a state agency, it is likely that active state supervision would not be
required, although we do not here decide that issue."'" That statement
embodies the formal approach to classifying entities. At the same time,
however, the Court characterized Goldfarb as a "private party" case, even
though Goldfarb expressly noted that the state bar association is a state
agency." 5 Given the apparent contradiction, the best interpretation is to
respect the Court's statement in Town of Hallie that it is not deciding the
issue of whether the active state supervision requirement applies to state
agencies. But if these statements must be reconciled, Town of Hallie could
stand for the proposition that a hybrid entity that is a state entity by law,
like the Virginia State Bar, is considered private if it its challenged activity
has certain characteristics, like fostering "anticompetitive practices for the
benefit of its members."' 1 6
Whether a hybrid state entity is subject to the active state supervision
requirement is determined on a case-by-case basis, but the FTC has
criticized lower courts because that "examination is not always as rigorous
as it might be. ' 17 Several federal circuit courts, however, have held that
certain financially-interested governmental bodies must meet Midcal's
active-state-supervision requirement." 8 Other lower court decisions have
held that state agencies are not subject to both of Midcal's requirements.' 9
111. Id. at 791.
112. Id. at 790-91. More specifically, foreshadowing the clear articulation requirement, the
Court stated that "it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court
Rules required the anticompetitive activities." Id. at 790. And addressing state supervision, the
Court noted that "[a]lthough the State Bar apparently has been granted the power to issue ethical
opinions, there is no indication in this record that the Virginia Supreme Court approves the
opinions." Id. at 791.
113. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104-05.
114. 471 U.S. at46 n.10.
115. Id. at 45 ("Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private parties-not municipalities-claiming
the state action exemption."). In Goldfarb, the Court directly acknowledged that the Virginia State
Bar is "a state agency by law." 421 U.S. at 789-90.
116. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791.
117. F.T.C. Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force, p. 37 (2003).
118. See, e.g., Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Forest, 930 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir.
1991); F.T.C. v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 689-90 (1st Cir. 1987); Norman's on the Waterfront,
Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1018 (3d Cir. 1971).
119. See, e.g., Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1041
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This split among the circuit courts makes this issue one that could
eventually receive Supreme Court attention if the right case comes along.
The FTC published an order denying a motion to dismiss on state action
grounds by a state dental board in In the Matter of South Carolina State
Board of Dentistry, but did not weigh in on the issue of whether both
prongs of the Midcal test should apply because the board could not even
satisfy the first prong-active supervision. 2 ' That case involved the FTC's
antitrust challenge to the South Carolina State Board of Dentistry's
regulation that contravened state legislation allowing dental hygienists to
provide preventative dental care to children in schools.' The dental
board's regulation reinstated a previous requirement that hygienists could
only treat such children that had received a supervising dentist exam within
the last 45 days.'22 The dental board-which is composed of seven dentists,
one hygienist and one public member-issued a regulation that would
increase demand for dentist services at the expense of hygienist services
(and consumers). The dental board tried to utilize state action immunity as a
shield, but the FTC rejected that defense because the regulation was not
within clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, even
though South Carolina's statutory regime gave the board broad authority to
regulate the fields of dentistry and dental hygiene.'23 The FTC held that
"'foreseeability' in this context must be restricted only to those regulatory
schemes in which the anticompetitive conduct would 'ordinarily or
routinely result' from the authorization legislation in order to ensure that
there was a deliberate and intended state policy." '124
III. LICENSING BOARDS THAT SEEK To EXPAND THEIR OWN MONOPOLY
SHOULD FACE HEIGHTENED ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
The requirement of a license to perform a service restricts entry into an
occupation and creates a government-sanctioned monopoly for those that
(5th Cir. 1998); Bankers Ins. Co. v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 137
F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (1Ith Cir. 1998); Haas v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989).
120. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss on State Action Grounds, Holding in Abeyance, S. C.
State Bd of Dentistry, F.T.C. Docket No. 9311 (July 28, 2004). See generally Jeffrey W. Brennan,
South Carolina State Board of Dentistry and the Role of Immunities in the Parker Doctrine, 21-
SPG ANTITRUST 41 (Spring 2007). The South Carolina State Board of Dentistry eventually
entered a consent decree with the FTC that overturned the board's regulation and required it notify
the FTC of future regulations on the same subject matter. See
www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/06/dentists.shtm.
121. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss on State Action Grounds, Holding in Abeyance, S. C.
State Bd. of Dentistry, F.T.C. Docket No. 9311 (July 28, 2004).
122. Id.
123. Id. Cf City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 (general grant of home rule power to municipality
was not sufficient to satisfy clear articulation requirement).
124. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss on State Action Grounds, Holding in Abeyance, S. C.
State Bd of Dentistry, F.T.C. Docket No. 9311 (July 28, 2004).
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are granted that license over a market for services equal to the scope of the
occupation. While competition would remain among the licensed
professionals, the restricted entry from the licensure requirements limits this
competition. 125 Thus, the jurisdiction of the licensed occupation is an
important issue because it defines the scope of the anticompetitive harm. At
the same time, the licensed members of an occupation financially benefit
from an expansive definition, which would allow them to avoid competition
from other occupations in the expanded territory.126
Naturally, licensing boards typically consist primarily of members of
the regulated occupation, as these individuals possess the best knowledge
and expertise about how to regulate and discipline the licensed members.
127
The obvious problem is that the actual individuals that determine the
exclusive jurisdiction of the occupation-and therefore the scope of the
anticompetitive harm-have strong incentives (either personally or on
behalf of their membership) to expand the reach of their occupation to the
detriment of both consumers and other occupations. Therefore, antitrust law
should treat these public boards as they would a private entity that seeks to
restrain trade-with great skepticism. That is, courts should not only
require that licensing boards fulfill both prongs of the Midcal test to receive
state action immunity, but should also analyze both the clear-articulation
and active-state-supervision requirements with the understanding that these
licensing boards have the structural incentive to expand their own
monopoly. 128
Thus, a legislature's clear articulation of the right of a state licensing
board to regulate an occupation should not be sufficient to permit a board to
expand its own monopoly relative to other occupations by expanding the
scope of how that occupation is defined.129 This would violate Parker's
admonition that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful."' 3 ° In addition, the sovereign state must actively supervise
the actual decision by a licensing board to broaden the scope of its
125. See HUMPHRIEs, KLEINER & KOUMENTA, supra note 18, at 7.8 (describing the evidence
that the supply of practitioners in regulated occupations is restricted by licensure requirements).
126. See Havighurst, supra note 22, at 596 (explaining that licensing boards may have little
enthusiasm for competition).
127. Id. ("Although practices vary, many states appoint the members of such boards from lists
of nominees provided by the professional or occupational group being regulated. A public
member or two is usually appointed as well, but such boards are rarely less than friendly to and
supportive of the licensed group.").
128. See Havighurst, supra note 22, at 598-99 ("[I]n deciding how explicit a state legislature
must be in authorizing curtailments of competition, they might apply the clear-articulation
requirement with special rigor to state boards that appear rooted in the self-regulatory tradition.").
129. Of course, the issue of whether a particular service is within an existing statutory
definition of an occupation may create a difficult question in certain circumstances.
130. 317U.S.at351.
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monopoly. A rubber-stamp acceptance of a board's anticompetitive activity
should not be sufficient to invoke the powerful shield of state action
immunity. To fulfill the active-state-supervision requirement, a state body
or official outside of and above the licensing board should have to approve
any decision by the licensing board to expand the scope of its monopoly.
The typical state delegation of authority to a board does not usually permit
members of the board to so easily create or expand market power in a way
that benefits the members and their occupation. Thus, the deferential
approach that courts typically employ for the clear-articulation requirement
is not sufficient in these circumstances because the state board has a conflict
of interest, and is not merely applying its expertise. 3 A heightened active-
state-supervision requirement will avoid Parker's prohibition against state
authorization to violate the antitrust laws'32 by making sure that it is the
state itself-and not a self-interested board-that is expanding the zone of
anticompetitive harm.
The competitive problem of a state board expanding its own monopoly
is not a mere hypothetical, but has actually occurred in at least two recent
cases. One of the instances led to an antitrust challenge by the FTC,'33 and
the other was challenged, but not on antitrust grounds.'34 These two cases
are discussed below.
A. In the Matter of The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners
The North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is an agency of the
State of North Carolina that "is charged with regulating the practice of
dentistry in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare of the
citizens of North Carolina."' 35 The board includes six licensed dentists, one
licensed hygienist, and one consumer member that is neither a dentist nor a
hygienist.'36 Notably, the dentist members are not appointed by state
officials, but are instead elected to the board by licensed dentists in North
Carolina.'37 Each elected member serves a three-year term. 3 ' It is unlawful
to practice dentistry in North Carolina without a license issued by this
board.'39
Both dentists and non-dentists in North Carolina offer teeth-whitening
13 1. See Havighurst, supra note 22, at 599 ("Certainly the foreseeability test employed in the
case of municipalities seems inappropriate in such cases, for few things are more foreseeable than
that a trade or profession empowered to regulate itself will produce anticompetitive regulations.").
132. 317 U.S. at 314.
133. See Complaint, N. C. Bd. of Dental Exam "rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 (June 17, 2000).
134. See Mitz, 278 S.W.3d at 20-21.
135. Complaint, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343, para. 1 (June 17, 2000).
136. Id. at para. 2.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at para. 4.
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services, but dentists charge substantially more for the service. 4 There is a
North Carolina dental statute, which, according to the FTC, does not
expressly address teeth whitening.' 4' The board, however, argues that a state
statute that limits the practice of dentistry to dentists and defines dentistry
as undertaking, attempting, or claiming the ability to "remove[] stains,
accretions, or deposits from the human teeth," directly addresses teeth
whitening. 142 This particular issue highlights the point that it is not always
easy to determine whether a state board is, in fact, expanding its own
exclusive jurisdiction.
The dental board made the determination that non-dentists that provide
teeth-whitening services in North Carolina are committing the unauthorized
practice of dentistry. 43 And, according to the FTC, the board has "engaged
in extra-judicial activities aimed at preventing non-dentists from providing
teeth whitening services in North Carolina."' 44 As a result, the dental board
excluded their lower-priced competitors from the market for teeth-
whitening services.'45 After a lengthy investigation,'46 the FTC concluded
that this action was anticompetitive and brought an administrative action
against the board.'47 This is an example of a state licensing board that is
using its authority to expand its own monopoly, in this case, to teeth
whitening services.
Not surprisingly, the board responded to the FTC's action by seeking
dismissal based upon the state action immunity doctrine.'4 8 Indeed, the
board felt so strongly that it was inappropriate for the FTC to proceed
against it as a state entity that (before any FTC decision) it filed its own
lawsuit for declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent
injunctions against the FTC.149 This was unusual, as the typical process is to
140. Complaint, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 at paras. 7 & 11 (June
17, 2010). There are also teeth whitening products like certain toothpastes and over-the-counter
whitening strips, but the FTC alleged that these products are inadequate substitutes for the services
performed by dentists and non-dentists. Id. at para. 12.
141. Id. at para. 15.
142. Motion to Dismiss by The NC. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 at 20,
(Nov. 3, 2010); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-29(b)(3).
143. Complaint, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 at para. 16 (June 17,
2000).
144. Id. at para. 19; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-29(b)(2).
145. Id. at paras. 11 & 24.
146. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 142, at 8; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-29(b)(3) ("The Complaint
was filed at the end of a two-year investigation.").
147. See generally Complaint, N. C. Bd. of Dental Exam "rs, F.T.C. Docket No. 9343 (June 17,
2000).
148. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 142, at 1.
149. See generally Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent
Injunction, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam 'rs v. Fed. Trade Comm 'n, Case 5:11-cv-00049-FL (E.D.N.C.
Feb. 2, 2011).
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appeal unfavorable FTC rulings to a federal court of appeals. 50 The board
was not shy about its position: "[T]he purpose of this action is to stop a
pointless, baseless, and predetermined federal administrative proceeding
that has impaired and continues to impair the ability of the State to protect
its public, contravenes federal and state statutes, directly encroaches upon
the State's sovereignty assured under the Tenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution . . . and defies very, very well-established Supreme
Court holdings."151
The FTC rejected the board's argument that it is protected by the state
action immunity doctrine.5 2 Commissioner William Kovacic, writing the
opinion for a unanimous Commission,'53 set forth the FTC's view on the
state immunity doctrine:
Because the balance between competition policy and federalism
embodied in the state action doctrine exempts only sovereign policy choices
from federal antitrust scrutiny, non-sovereign defendants invoking the state
action defense must clear additional hurdles to ensure that their challenged
conduct truly comports with a state decision to forego the benefits of
competition to pursue alternative goals.'54
The FTC took the position that the requirements to invoke the defense
"vary depending on the extent to which a tribunal is concerned that
decision-makers are pursuing private rather than sovereign interests."'5
Thus, the FTC took an incentive-based approach rather than a formal
approach in deciding how to apply the Midcal test. More specifically, the
FTC concluded that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence required that "when
determining whether the state's active supervision is required, the operative
factor is a tribunal's degree of confidence that the entity's decision-making
process is sufficiently independent from the interests of those being
regulated."' 56 The FTC reasoned that
allowing the antitrust laws to apply to the unsupervised decisions of
self-interested regulators acts as a check to prevent conduct that is not in the
public interest; absent antitrust to police their actions, unsupervised self-
interested boards would be subject to neither political nor market discipline
to serve consumers' best interests.157
150. See Fed. R. App. P. 15.
151. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, supra
note 149, at 1.
152. See Opinion of the Commission, supra note 8.
153. Id. at n. I (Commissioner Julie Brill did not participate in the matter).
154. Id. at 1.
155. Id.; see also Elhauge, supra note 7, at 695 (advancing the theory that "state action
immunity applies only when a financially disinterested state official controls the terms of the
challenged restraint").
156. Opinion of the Commission, supra note 8, at 9.
157. Id. at 1l.
No. 2] Antitrust Implications ofLicensed Occupations Choosing Jurisdiction 49
Applying this principle to state licensing boards, the FTC held that "a
state regulatory body that is controlled by participants in the very industry it
purports to regulate must satisfy both prongs of Midcal to be exempted
from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine."' 58
The FTC did not examine the first prong of Midcal-clear
articulation-because it concluded that the board's conduct was not actively
supervised. The FTC described this test as guaranteeing that "self-interested
parties are restricting competition in a manner consonant with state
policy."' 59 The "active supervision converts private conduct, which is
subject to antitrust review, into a sovereign policy choice, which is not."'60
In the case at hand, the FTC ultimately rejected the board's argument that it
was subject to active state supervision, as the only oversight was "generic"
and there was no suggestion that "a state actor was even aware of the
Board's policy toward non-dentist teeth-whitening, let alone reviewed or
approved it in fulfillment of the active supervision requirement."'' 1 This
decision, however, is not likely the final word in this case. The board's
vociferous response to this administrative lawsuit suggests that this is a
battle that could continue for a while.
B. Mitz v. Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners
The Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners is an agency
of the State of Texas that is charged with developing, adopting, and
enforcing laws and rules necessary to carry out the Veterinary Licensing
Act. 6 ' Similar to the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, the Texas
board is dominated by licensed professionals-six practicing veterinarians
and three public members.1 63 Members are appointed by the governor and
serve six-year terms.164
This dispute centered around a service to horse owners and breeders
called teeth "floating," which "involves using a file to make teeth level and
ensure proper alignment."' 165 Prior to 2007, horse teeth floating (and teeth
extraction) services were performed by non-veterinarians, who competed
with veterinarians. 66 Similar to the North Carolina dental case, the board
158. Id. atl3.
159. Id. atl4.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 16.
162. See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §§ 801.001-.004, .051 .053; see also Plaintiffs' First Amended
Verified Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Mitz v. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med.
Exam'rs, Cause No. D-1-GN-07-002707 at para. 16 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis County October 9,
2007).
163. See Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam'rs, Board Members,
www.tbvme.state.tx.us/agency/php (last visited March 29, 2011).
164. See id.
165. Mitz, 278 S.W.3d at 20.
166. Id.
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eventually made a determination that only licensed veterinarians should be
able to provide these services, and it began to send cease-and-desist letters
to non-veterinarians who practiced teeth-floating.167 Thus, as in North
Carolina, the state board of professionals sought to exercise its authority to
eliminate competition by expanding its own exclusive jurisdiction.168 The
Institute for Justice, on behalf of four non-veterinarian teeth-floaters and
two horse breeders that hire such teeth-floaters, sought declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief against the board, but not on antitrust
grounds. 1
69
The FTC, however, eventually weighed into the dispute by sending a
letter to the board, urging it not to adopt a rule limiting teeth-floating to
licensed veterinarians unless "the benefits to purchasers of teeth floating
would be greater than the harm that would result from the elimination of
competition."'7 ° The FTC explained in its letter that "Texas horse owners
likely would pay more for horse floating services if veterinarian supervision
of lay horse floaters were required, because the proposal would insulate
veterinarians from competition by lay horse teeth floaters."'' At the same
time, the policy "does not appear to provide any countervailing benefits."'7 2
The plaintiffs eventually prevailed on summary judgment, as the Texas
trial court ruled that the board's rule change failed "to comply with the
rulemaking requirements of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act."' 73 An
interesting question, however, is whether the FTC or a private plaintiff
could have also prevailed on antitrust grounds? And, since the decision was
on procedural grounds, if the board tries again to promulgate a similar rule
(through the correct procedures this time), could it be subject to antitrust
scrutiny?
167. Id. atn. 2.
168. Plaintiff's complaint in Mitz alleged that one member of the board was explicit about the
anticompetitive purpose of the change in policy: "Defendant Reveley has publicly urged
veterinarians who are the beneficiaries of this monopoly to contact their state legislators because it
is 'clear' to her that lay-people like the Practitioner-Plaintiffs are 'chipping-away' at the work of
veterinarians 'in every jurisdiction."' Plaintiffs' First Amended Verified Petition for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, Mitz v. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam'rs, Cause No. D- I -GN-07-
002707 at para. 48 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis County), filed October 9, 2007.
169. Mitz, 278 S.W.3d at 19. Plaintiffs did, however, include a state claim under the Texas
Constitution based upon the Prohibition Against Monopolies, but it does not appear that this claim
was actively litigated. TEX. CONST., art. I, § 26; Plaintiffs' First Amended Verified Petition for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Mitz v. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam 'rs, Cause No.
D-I-GN-07-002707 at paras. 45-48 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis County October 9, 2007); Mitz, 278
S.W.3d at 20-21 (listing claims, including "monopoly prohibition").
170. Letter from F.T.C. to Ms. Loris Jones, Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners at
1 (August 20, 2010) (available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/09/10091Otexasteethfloating.pdf).
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id.
173. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Mitz v. Tex. State Bd. of
Veterinary Med. Exam "rs, Cause No. D- I -GN-07-002707 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis County Nov. 10,
2010).
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The major issue in any such antitrust challenge, of course, would come
down to whether the board could take advantage of state action immunity. As
described above, the lower courts are not consistent in how they scrutinize state
licensing agencies that seek state action immunity.'74 But, as the FTC
recognized in its North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners decision, the
Supreme Court's Goldfarb'75 analysis, "strongly suggests that . . . . active
supervision is crucial, even for a state agency, in circumstances where the state
agency's decisions are not sufficiently independent from the entities that the
agency regulates."' 76 Indeed, this case would be very similar in structure to the
FTC's case against the dental board in North Carolina. Both state boards,
dominated by members of the profession they regulate, sought to expand the
monopoly for their licensed members at the expense of competitors and
consumers. Thus, as in the North Carolina dental case, to utilize the state action
immunity shield, the Texas board would likely have to show that its policy to
expand the jurisdiction of veterinarians was "clearly articulated" by the state
legislature, and that the state itself "actively supervised" the decision.'7 7 While
the actual result of this inquiry would depend upon the facts uncovered during
discovery, the board would have a difficult case because the Texas state court's
holding that the board's teeth floating decision violated rulemaking
requirements 78 suggests that the anticompetitive decision was probably not
clearly articulated by the state sovereign. In any event, it would be an
interesting battle.
IV. CONCLUSION
Private actors do not have a monopoly over anticompetitive conduct. Public
entity actions are often anticompetitive but usually escape antitrust scrutiny because
of the state immunity doctrine. State licensing boards are legally part of the state,
but have conflicts of interests that incent them to act like private entities that seek to
protect themselves and their occupation from competition. For that reason, except
in rare instances, these state licensing boards-dominated by members of the
regulated occupation-should face antitrust scrutiny when they enact policies or
take actions that expand their own exclusive jurisdiction at the expense of
consumers and competitors. Although current law grants a state sovereign the right
to take anticompetitive actions (at least within its borders), it does not allow states
to immunize private actors from the antitrust laws. And that is exactly what occurs
when a state licensing board is permitted to expand the monopoly of its members.
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175. 421 U.S. at 790-91.
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177. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
178. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Mitz v. Tex. State Bd of
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